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According to Katalin Havas dialectical contradictions are fully compatible with
classical logic, since, owing to a distinction between internal and external
negations, graduality does not entail the existence of true logical contradictions.
The distinction, though, is not sufficient to support her point unless further
manoeuvres are resorted to, bringing about a complete mutual estrangement of
both negations, and thus severing the tie between natural language and formaliza-
tion. Implementing dialectical views through some paraconsistent logic of
fuzziness seems a preferable procedure.
In her book Logic and Dialectic: Essays in the Philosophy of Logic (Budapest: Hun-
garian Academy of Sciences, 1989), Katalin Havas broaches a number of topics on the rela-
tionship between logic and the idea of true contradictions ingrained in the dialectical
tradition which comprised at least some of the main Marxist thinkers. The book sheds light
on some developments of the debate which grew within that tradition and ended with the
defeat of the noncompatibilists — those who held that there was a conflict between the
acceptance of dialectical contradictions and Aristotelian logic including the classical system
of mathematical logic. Havas herself is a compatibilist, and all her book displays a variety
of defenses of compatibilism. Many people deem the controversy outdated and of no interest
for our present concerns, since Marxism is supposed to have ceased to be one of the
appealing paradigms. Should it be so, we could hardly afford to forget that up until quite
recently it has been one of the dominating trends of contemporary thought. So going into
its relationship with logic is no idle or pointless exercise.
One of the ironies of the whole story is that the victory of the compatibilists was
reached very late — well after the secund world war — and that the main reason for it was
the prestige and authority of classical mathematical logic. Those among Marxist philos-
ophers who maintained an incompatibilist stand had cornered themselves into an
indefensible situation by rejecting the whole of “formal” logic as flawed, as reflecting only
the superficial and static side of reality, whereas deep and dynamic facets of the world could
be mirrored only by an unformalizable dialectical logic. Such an approach was clearly
obscurantist, and most everybody now can feel sympathetic to people as Katalin Havas, who
have endeavoured to overcome an attitude which debarred Marxists from taking mathemat-
ical-logic work seriously and from engaging in it.
Yet, it seems to me that compatibilists — such as Katalin Havas — have thrown the
baby with the bath water. It was unfortunate and perhaps odd that along the protracted con-
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troversy over the relation between dialectical and “formal” logic, only seldom did anybody
evoke the possibility of taking a “synthesising” approach, by dint of formalizing dialectical
logic through some non classical formal system. Yet, there had been overtures from the pro-
fessional logicians’ side. Thus when St. Jas´kowski propounded the first system of paracon-
sistent logic (i.e. a system without the Cornubia rule: p, not-p q), he listed a number of
philosophical motivations for the system, one of them being the formalization of Marxist
dialectics. No one took the clue. After all, who cared about such oddities as non-classical
systems of mathematical logic? Thus, just when classical logic was really dislodging
traditional schools which had until then managed to hold their ground in University teach-
ing, incompatibilism began a rapid and steady waning which ended in an almost complete
defeat shortly before the whole castle of established Marxism collapsed. At about the same
time, non-classical systems of mathematical logic began to burgeon, and particularly fuzzy
logic and fuzzy set-theories started a prodigious career leading to startling results.
If incompatibilists failed to exploit the existence of nonclassical logics — their claim
being that dialectics was beyond the scope of formalizable thought —, compatibilists were
of course keen on viewing CL as “the” one and only true logic.
It is a merit of K. Havas’s book the she — alone perhaps among compatibilists — con-
siders the possibility of using nonclassical, and especially paraconsistent logics, to formalize
dialectics. Her answer I find somehow unclear or hesitant, but her main line is undoubtedly
that, whatever the utility of such logical systems, in the main dialectics does not need them,
since it is wholly compatible with Aristotelian logic.
I am not going to canvass all arguments and considerations displayed by K. Havas
for her thesis. And besides I am not particularly concerned about the original issue of the
compatibility between Marxism and “formal” logic. The topic of this paper is only the
relationship between degrees and contradictions. I feel pretty sure the dialectical tradition
espoused a view of degrees of truth, and that was in fact one of the grounds — if not the
ground — for countenancing true contradictions. Be it as it may does the existence of
degrees imply that there are true contradictions?
K. Havas’s answer is a definite “It depends”. She discusses (pp. 88ff) an argument
of mine to the effect that, since Alboran is to some extent dry, it is dry, and, since to some
extent it is not dry, it is not dry; hence it both is and is not dry.
Havas’s view is that you can say that, but then you are using the words in a different
way from that of traditional and classical logic. If you use ‘not’ and ‘and’ as classical logic
does, the fact that Alboran is in between complete dryness and entire humidity does not
clash with the laws of CL.
How is that? Havas’s main idea is that incompatibilists mistake our thinking of
reality for reality itself. Reality is a web, an intermingling of facets, which lies in a dynamic
entanglement, where opposite properties are intertwined. Yet, we cannot think reality as it
is. We can think only by representation. The world as such is not present to our cognitive
capacity. Now, representing the world entails dividing it, breaking it up into pieces, each
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of which definitely has a property and lacks its opposite. Logic rules over our thought. And
logic demands a separation of opposite properties. We cannot think in any other way.
Does that mean that reality as such is contradictory while our thought is bound to be
noncontradictory? No. It makes no sense — so K. Havas claims — to say that reality as such
is contradictory — or non-contradictory. I take it we can speak and think only about reality
as it is given to us through concepts. And concepts are bound to be discrete, separate from
one another, and thus allowing no overlapping of opposites.
Now, what exactly is the nature of such constraints? It is not clear to me whether K.
Havas takes them to be anthropologic or analytic — or “apophantic” in some Husserlian
sense. In other words, it is unclear to me whether she believes that our thought is bound to
be contradictionless in virtue of some particular frame of the human mind, or in virtue of
some a priori requirement for something to be a representation, or a concept.
The foregoing considerations do not prevent K. Havas from allowing a role for non-
classical logics wherein negations may behave differently from classical negation. Does the
use of such a logic mean that after all our concepts do not have to comply with such
constraints as determine CL in general and classical negation in particular? No, for the
meaning of negation in those logics is different, and hence it cannot be truthfully said that
they fail to comply with CL constraints. Such constraints apply only wherever the meaning
of the connectives is the same as in CL.
All of this does not entail that logic is completely independent from the way the
world is. (This is why it is unclear to me whether the constraints are meant to be purely a
priori, analytical.) In order for CL and in general concept-formation to be usefully
applicable to the world, some requirements are called for, namely (p. 89): there must be
some stability, some things sharing a number of properties, while other things lack those
properties; things do not lose their properties every moment in every respect, and nothing
loses a property the very same moment it acquires the property. Havas does not say whether
worlds where such constraints fail are possible. I surmise she would reply that they are
classically impossible — which of course only triggers a regress of similar puzzles. Since the
world satisfies those minimal requirements, CL can usefully be applied to it. Since it also
has facets of motion, instability, entanglement of opposite properties, nonclassical — and
especially paraconsistent — logics can also be applied, but with different meanings being
ascribed to the connectives.
Havas tackles an argument I had put forward to show that graduality entails the exis-
tence of true contradictions — to which I have already referred hereinabove. Havas thinks
that the inconsistency is (merely) apparent. She claims that it may be true that Alboran is
not dry without its being the case that Alboran is not-dry. Graduality of dryness entails that
an entity, like the island of Alboran, may both fail to be dry and fail to be not-dry; it does
not entail that it may both be dry and not-dry.
Are we then bound to divide the world into three multiplicities, that of dry things,
that of not-dry things, and that of things which are neither? Not necessarily. It depends on
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what cognition processes are involved. For a number of processes and concerns, it suffices
to establish dichotomies like dry/not-dry, day/night, etc. For some purposes, we establish
trichotomies, like day/twilight/night, dry/moist/wet, and so on. She goes on (p. 95):
In the case of Alboran, due to the arisen apparent inconsistency, we have to widen our uni-
verse of discourse and in this widened universe, w2, we have to make other divisions, com-
paring with what was done in that narrower universe w1.
In w2 we have to abandon the equivalences ‘not-dry = wet’ and ‘not-wet = dry’.
Consequently, the meaning of (3) [‘Alboran is not-dry’] is changed (…) [it] will not have
the same meaning as ‘Alboran is wet’, but it will be equivalent to: (7) Alboran is wet or
it is not completely wet and not completely dry.
It is clear what K. Havas is after: literally taken, ‘Alboran is not-dry’ is false,
completely false. We had divided the world into dry and not-dry things. We find out that
some things are neither [completely] dry nor [completely] not-dry; one of them is that
island. Then we are compelled to introduce a new bunch of entities in between the two
extremes. Yet even with the new conceptual framework it will remain [completely] false that
Alboran is dry, and also that it is not-dry. It will be fully true that it is not dry and also
wholly true that it is not not-dry. So, when we say (3), what we are really meaning is not
literally (3), which is [utterly] false, but some plausible truth, like (7). In other words, by
saying that Alboran is not-dry, we mean that it is not dry — and hence either not-dry or both
not [completely] dry and not [completely] not-dry.
Distinguishing internal from external negation is one of the traditional solutions to
paradoxes of sundry sorts. Havas is fond of Aristotelian logic and — or so it seems to me
— of Aristotelian philosophy in general. Her distinction here is in agreement with such
leanings. Such a solution has real merit. After all there are nontrivial grounds for thinking
that being unkind is not necessarily the same as not being kind. My PC is neither. So,
cannot such a distinction also solve the paradox of graduality — namely that, since what is
to some extent the case is the case, every situation of an entity having a property only up
to a point is one where some contradiction is true?
I think the solution is riddled with difficulties, and so I doubt that it can really solve
the problem. Here are my objections.
1st Objection. The distinction between being not-so and not being so calls for a
theory of properties, duly axiomatized and modelized. No such theory is provided by K.
Havas’s book. Nor need it be, of course. The views just described can be taken as sketching
a program, rather than as expressing a developed account. Pending the filling out of a
detailed theory of properties along those lines, the distinction can be considered only a
rough hint at a sort of solution. Even so, it is in principle implausible. In so far as possible,
we ought to equate having thus or so property φ with having the property of thus-or-so-φ
— with ‘not’ being a case of the generic ‘thus-or-so’ which is a place holder for any alethic
modifier, whether negation or alethic qualification (‘to some extent’, ‘highly’, etc.). I am not
saying that under no circumstances can you differentiate one from the other. What I say is
that a strong reason for the difference is needed — and in so far as possible a proof that the
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solution is workable and indeed solves the problem. Unless and until anything like that is
provided, we had rather stand by the equations under debate. And even should we depart
from them, we would be well-advised if our departure was as small as possible, which
means that as many inferences as possible must be kept among the ones which were counte-
nanced by the equations. Else, the mere use of the words seems arbitrary. The less ‘not’ in
‘not-dry’ is related to ‘not’ in ‘not dry’, the more arbitrary the use of the word is.
2d Objection. Suppose ‘Alboran is not dry’ does not entail ‘Alboran is not-dry’. If
modus tollens does not apply here, our conditional or entailment connective is bound to be
nonclassical. Havas clearly has classical conditionals in mind. So modus tollens (and contra-
position) apply. Hence ‘Alboran is not not-dry’ does not entail ‘Alboran is dry’ (I am
assuming involutivity). Thus we block the inference from ‘Alboran is neither dry nor not-
dry’ to ‘Alboran is and is not dry’. Well and good. Still, since it is true that Alboran neither
is dry nor is not-dry, it is false that it is dry and it is false that it is not-dry. (External
negation is clearly intended by Havas in a strong classical way — and hence «not-p» can
hardly be distinguished from its being false that p.) It is hence false that it is dry or not-dry.
Now, whether the emerging theory of properties is strong or weak, surely we do not want
it to take «A is φ or not-φ» as false (downright false — no degrees of falsity applying within
such a classical framework). Perhaps we would buy taking such formulae as truth-value-less,
or as having a value which is neither true nor false, or anything like that but hardly as being
[completely] false. Yet, Havas’s account clearly equates being true with being entirely true.
So, if the distinction between internal and external negation is going to be credible,
workable and useful for the purpose at hand, it had rather be implemented so as to avoid
that prima facie instances of excluded middle turn out to be utterly false. Which of course
leads us beyond CL.
3d Objection. What in the first place gives rise to the “neutro-diction” that Alboran
is neither dry nor not dry is that when you ask a knowledgeable geographer whether
Alboran is dry, he will probably say that neither it is nor it isn’t. How can such an answer,
‘Neither it is nor it isn’t’, be paraphrased so as to mean ‘It is not dry and it is not not-dry’?
The segment ‘it isn’t’ was clearly an abbreviation of ‘it is not’. For Havas’s account to start
to seem plausible, it is necessary that in that case ‘it is not’ be short for ‘it is not-’, so as
to render ‘Neither it is nor it isn’t’ short for ‘Neither it is dry nor is it not-dry’. However
it seems pretty odd — to say the least — that such a paraphrase should be possible ‘Neither
it is nor it isn’t’ sounds clearly as a joint-negation of the same thing, not as a joint-negation
of two different property-ascriptions. There are various reasons for that. One is that an
internal ‘not’ probably cannot be contracted; the contraction ‘isn’t’ clearly seems to be a
unit, which results from applying ‘not’ to ‘is’ — hence to the whole atomic sentence; it does
not arise from uniting ‘is’ with the prefix ‘not-’ of the predicate ‘not-dry’ (or «not-
whatever»). Another reason is that the elision of the predicates in a conjunction cannot be
done if they are different: ‘Peter is clever and [Peter] is strong’ cannot be paraphrased or
abbreviated as ‘Peter is and is’, whatever the context.
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All of that only shows that the natural answer ‘Neither Alboran is dry nor is it not
dry’, or the like, conveys the literal sense that Alboran is not dry and that is not not dry —
hence that it both is and is not dry, in virtue of involutivity. But the natural answer might
be wrong? Yes, it might. What alone has been shown by my third objection is that Havas’s
introduction of the dash is not a prima facie plausible ploy — is not a natural way of
wording the “naive” answer.
4th Objection. Havas claims that when people say (3), upon realizing that Alboran
is in between the extremes of being altogether dry and entirely lacking dryness, what they
mean is something like (7). Let us suppose that ‘is wet’ just abbreviates ‘is not-dry’
(otherwise the remark would be immaterial for the present debate). Hence when people say
that Alboran neither is dry nor is not dry, what — according to Havas — they mean is that
either Alboran is not-dry or it is neither completely not-dry nor completely dry. But, what
is the role of ‘completely’ here? Does Havas accept that being dry is the same as being
completely dry? Such is the feeling one gets, since through the conceptual revision Havas
views as conducing to the trichotomic classification things fall into three bunches: dry, not-
dry and neither. No place here for a special range of things dry but not completely dry. Dry
and not-dry are clearly taken to be the extremes, with what is neither being in between. So
the wording of (7) is clearly meant to be a paraphrase of:
(9) Alboran is not-dry or else it neither is dry nor is not-dry.
Now, (9) may be taken to be a paraphrase of ‘Alboran is not dry’ but — unless the
distinction Havas is after collapses — hardly of ‘Alboran is not-dry’. For surely both
disjuncts in (9) entail ‘Alboran is not dry’, which in turn entails (9). Now, he natural answer
to our question about whether Alboran is dry is not (10) but (10’):
(10) Alboran is neither dry nor not-dry
(10’) Alboran is neither dry nor not dry
We can envisage paraphrasing the first conjunct of either (10) or (10’) as (9). Now,
the conjunction of (9) with ‘Alboran is dry’ remains a contradiction. And so, by involution,
(10’) is a contradiction.
Anyway, what is the reason for inserting the dash into the second conjunct of the
second disjunct of (9)? As a part of paraphrasing the naive answer, the insertion of the dash
is dubious — a theoretical gambit which may work, but which we can hardly foist on the
naive geographer. So, the natural paraphrase of the first conjunct of the natural response has
to be not (9) but (9’):
(9’) Alboran is not dry or neither it is dry nor it is not dry or, in other words, and less con-
tortedly, (11):
(11) Alboran is not dry, or else it neither is dry nor fails to be dry.
In virtue of usually accepted logical rules (11) (and hence (9’)) boils down to (12)
(12) Alboran is not dry
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Which brings us back to the contradiction, that Alboran neither is nor fails to be dry
— hence is both dry and not dry.
Thus Havas’s ploy in support of maintaining CL fails.
Moreover, if my construal of her ideas is not mistaken, what she thinks is that in
reality dryness and not-dryness are in fact enmeshed or melted, whereas in our representa-
tion they are bound to be secluded. In some sense, contradictions are true in reality but we
cannot say so, since all our assertions concern reality as represented. Yet she has managed
to speak about reality itself — as against reality qua represented —, to somehow or other
convey some information as to what reality is like and how the opposites are interweaved
until our mind proceeds to making cuts.
Has not Katalin Havas managed to say the ineffable, the existence of true
contradictions in things beyond or below the level of language and thought? Why then is
not a paraconsistent logic appropriate for such sayings as her own? Are her own assertions
taken to comply with CL? Or is it only at the object-language level — or something like that
— that CL is bound to rule?
